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This paper proposes a utility theory for decision making under uncer-
tainty that is described by possibility theory. We show that our approach
is a natural generalization of the two axiomatic systems that correspond
to pessimistic and optimistic decision criteria proposed by Dubois et al.
The generalization is achieved by removing axioms that are supposed to
reflect attitudes toward uncertainty, namely, pessimism and optimism. In
their place we adopt an axiom that imposes an order on a class of canoni-
cal lotteries that realize either in the best or in the worst prize. We prove
an expected utility theorem for the generalized axiomatic system based
on the newly introduced concept of binary utility.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we propose a utility theory for decision
making under uncertainty that is described by the possibility theory. Second,
we show that our approach generalizes a recent proposal by Dubois et al. [4].
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in qualitative decision
making within the artificial intelligence and decision analysis communities [2].
The aim of the research is to deal with situations where probability and utility
inputs required by the classical Bayesian decision theory are difficult to assess
or when the postulates underlying this theory are challenged. Among several
alternative approaches for modeling uncertainty, belief function theory [15, 16],
interval-valued probability [12, 19], Spohn’s theory of epistemic belief [17] and
possibility theory [20, 6] have been extensively studied.
Once uncertainty has been represented, the next step is to determine how
it can be used for making decisions. For belief functions and interval-valued
probabilities, where a situation is represented by a family of probability distri-
butions instead of a single one, the classical Bayesian decision theory can be
used in two ways. Either, a probability distribution from the family is selected
according to some criteria (e.g., pignistic probability [16]), then, for each alter-
native an expected utility can be calculated. Or, for each alternative, a range of
expectations is assessed with respect to probability functions in the family [19].
Comparison between alternatives boils down to comparing lower and upper ex-
pectations. Several scholars argue for the use of Choquet expected utility as an
extension of von Neumann - Morgenstern classical expected utility in situations
where uncertainty is represented by non-additive probability [14, 13]. For possi-
bility theory, which apparently has no such strong connection with probability,
the technique is of little use. In recent years, efforts have been made by Dubois,
Fargier, Godo, Prade, Sabbadin, and Zapico to create an axiomatic basis for
possibility-based decision theory. The efforts are in two different but related di-
rections following von Neumann - Morgenstern and Savage [4, 7]. Also, we have
proposed a different axiomatic system for decision making for possibility-based
decision theory [10]. In this paper, we compare these two proposals.
An outline of this article is as follows. In section 2, the proposal by Dubois
et al. for a decision theory with possibility theory is reviewed. In section 3, we
present a new system of axioms. The concept of binary utility is introduced.
The representation theorem based on binary utility for the new axiom system
is proved. In section 4, we compare our approach against one argued by Dubois
and others. We prove a theorem stating that the two axiomatic systems by
Dubois et al. are special cases of our system. Examples that illustrate the
calculations with different utility functions are provided. Finally, in section 5,
we conclude with some remarks.
2
2 Pessimistic and Optimistic Utilities
In this section, we review with some modification of terminology, the proposal
that has been described in [4]. A decision maker faces a situation that can be
described as follows. There is a set S of possible states and a finite uncertainty
scale V . Without loss of generality, V is assumed to be a set of points in the
closed unit interval [0, 1]. Order ≥ on V is defined in the usual way. Uncertainty
about which possible state will occur is represented by a possibility distribution
that is a mapping π : S → V such that maxs∈S π(s) = 1. The possibility of a
subset A ⊆ S, π(A) def= maxs∈A π(s). Let X = {x1, x2, . . . xn} denote a finite set
of consequences or prizes. To avoid trivialities, X is assumed to have at least
two distinct elements, i.e., n ≥ 2.
A decision is a mapping d : S → X . That is, decision d results in con-
sequence d(s) if state s occurs. Notice that each decision d induces a pos-
sibility distribution πd on the set X of consequences in the following sense:
πd(x)
def= π(d−1(x)) where d−1(x) = {s ∈ S|d(s) = x}. A possibility distribution
on X is also called a possibilistic lottery. Later on in this paper we just call
it lottery. Sometimes, we use a list notation [π(x1)/x1, π(x2)/x2 . . . π(xn)/xn]
to denote a lottery π with the convention that impossible consequences (con-
sequences x with π(x) = 0) are omitted. The set of lotteries is denoted by
ΠX . Notice that ΠX is closed under the operation possibilistic mix defined as
follows. A possibilistic mixture of m possibility functions π1, . . . πm with possi-
bilities λ1, . . . λm such that maxi∈{1,2,...m}{λi} = 1 is defined as




See [3] for more details.
To the decision maker, the value of decision d is the same as the value of
the induced lottery πd. And thanks to the mixture construct, the set ΠX is
rich enough to encode not only a simple lottery but also a “compound” lottery.
Intuitively, the concept of a possibilistic mixture is similar to that of multi-stage
probabilistic lottery. Notice that each prize x ∈ X can be viewed as a lottery
denoted by πx where πx(x) = 1 and πx(x′) = 0 for x′ 	= x. Later on, symbols
x and πx will be used interchangeably. Thus, a preference for decisions is the
same as a preference for lotteries. Let 
 (read as “at least as good as”) denote
a preference relation on the set ΠX of possibility distributions. (Two derivative
relations  for strict preference, and ∼ for indifference are also used.)
Since X ⊆ ΠX , 
 applies to X as well. Since X is finite and has at least
two distinct elements, we can single out a best prize and a worst prize denoted
by x and x respectively i.e., x 
 x and x 
 x ∀x ∈ X . These two elements are
called the anchors of set X .
A preference relation can be characterized by a system of axioms it must
satisfy. Or it can be represented by a utility function that maps ΠX into some
(finite) linearly ordered scale U called the utility scale. We will assume sup(U) =
1 and inf(U) = 0. The preference relation ≥ is used for both numerical and
utility comparison.
3
Dubois et al. propose two types of utilities called pessimistic and optimistic
utilities. In [4], the authors study two axiomatic systems in the style of von
Neumann and Morgenstern. They show that a preference relation satisfying
one of the axiom systems is represented by the pessimistic utility function, and
the other system is represented by the optimistic utility function. In [7], those
two utility functions are justified by axiom systems in the style of Savage. The
difference is that in the former approach, a possibility function on states is
assumed to be given, whereas in the latter approach such a function is deduced
from a preference relation on the set of actions.
2.1 Pessimistic Utility
The pessimistic utility concept needs the following ingredients: a function
u : X → U (2)
that is called utility assignment of prizes such that u(x) = 1 and u(x) = 0;
a function
n : U → U (3)
that is an order reversing involution in U i.e. n(1) = 0, n(0) = 1 and
n(u1) ≥ n(u2) whenever u2 ≥ u1; and a function
h : V → U (4)
that is an order preserving mapping from uncertainty scale V onto util-
ity scale U such that h(1) = 1 and h(0) = 0. A pessimistic qualitative utility
function QU− : ΠX → U is defined as follows:
QU− (π) def= min
x∈X
max(nh(π(x)), u(x)) (5)
where nh def= n ◦ h is composition of n and h. We list a simple lemma whose
proof is straightforward
Lemma 1
QU− (x) = QU− ([1/x, 1/x]) = 0
QU− (x) = 1
QU− ([1/x, λ/x]) = nh(λ).
Given a utility function u : ΠX → U , one can define a preference relation 
u on
ΠX as π1 
u π2 iff u(π1) ≥ u(π2). We say 
u is represented by u. A preference
relation can be characterized by its properties stated as axioms. The authors
study the following axiom system consisting of four axioms denoted by SP .
A1− (Total pre-order) 
 is reflexive, transitive and complete.
A2− (Uncertainty aversion) If π′ ≥ π then π 
 π′.
A3− (Substitutability) If π1 ∼ π2 then [λ/π1, µ/π] ∼ [λ/π2, µ/π].
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A4− (Continuity) ∀π ∈ ΠX , ∃λ ∈ V π ∼ [1/x, λ/x].
Dubois et al. prove the following representation theorem.
Theorem 1 A preference relation 
 on ΠX satisfies system SP iff there exist
functions u, n, h and pessimistic utility function QU− defined by equations (2,
3, 4, 5) such that π 
 π′ iff QU− (π) ≥ QU−(π′).
2.2 Optimistic Utility
The authors also consider another utility function that supposedly captures
the optimistic behavior of decision makers. The optimistic qualitative utility
function QU+ : ΠX → U is defined as follows




QU+ (x) = 0
QU+ (x) = QU+ ([1/x, 1/x]) = 1
QU+ ([λ/x, 1/x]) = h(λ).
The system SO of axioms that characterizes QU+ is obtained from SP by sub-
stituting axioms A2− and A4− by their diametrical counterparts A2+ and A4+,
respectively, where
A2+ (Uncertainty attraction) If π ≥ π′ then π 
 π′.
A4+ (Continuity) ∀π ∈ ΠX , ∃λ ∈ V π ∼ [λ/x, 1/x].
They also prove a representation theorem, similar to Theorem 1, for QU+
and SO. Note that decision based on QU− , QU+ could be viewed as extensions
of the minimax and maximax rules (for details about these rules see [1]).
We end this review section with some numerical examples illustrating the
use of pessimistic and optimistic utilities.
Example 1. Let X = {x, x2, x3, x}. x  x2  x3  x. V = {1, .7, .5, 0} and
U = {1, .5, .3, 0}. Suppose that the decision maker is considering three lotteries
π1, π2, π3 ∈ ΠX
X x x2 x3 x
π1 .7 1.0 .5 .5
π2 .5 .7 0 1.0
π3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Since the cardinality of X equals that of utility scale U the only consistent
utility assignment is
X x x2 x3 x
u 1 .5 .3 0
5
In order to decide on a preference relation between the lotteries, one needs to
elicit the utility by revealing the indifference between the prizes and canonical
lotteries, which end up either with the best or the worst prize. Because the
cardinality of X equals that of uncertainty scale V , for each of axioms A4− and
A4+, there is only one set of indifference that satisfies it.
Case 1. For A4−, the set of indifference is x ∼ [1/x, 0/x], x2 ∼ [1/x, .5/x],
x3 ∼ [1/x, .7/x] and x ∼ [1/x, 1/x]. This decision maker is classified as pes-
simistic. By lemma 1, function nh that maps V to U must be nh(1) = 0,
nh(.7) = .3, nh(.5) = .5 and nh(0) = 1. This function could be a composition
of n and h given as follows.
U 1 .5 .3 0
n 0 .3 .5 1
V 1 .7 .5 0
h 1 .5 .3 0
Using definition (5), we calculate utility for π1, π2 and π3


















= min{1, .5, .5, .5} = .5.
And similarly for π2, π3 we have QU− (π2) = 0 and QU− (π3) = 0. Thus, QU−
(for the decision maker) ranks π1  π2 ∼ π3.
Case 2. For optimistic A4+, the set of indifference is x ∼ [1/x, 1/x],
x2 ∼ [.7/x, 1/x], x3 ∼ [.5/x, 1/x] and x ∼ [0/x, 1/x]. By lemma 2, we know that
function h must be the same as above.


















= max{.5, .5, .3, 0} = .5.
And similarly for π2, π3 we have QU+ (π2) = .5 and QU+ (π3) = 1. Thus, QU+
(for the optimistic decision maker) ranks π3  π1 ∼ π2.
3 Binary Possibilistic Utility
In this section, we investigate a new system of axioms for preference relations
on the set of lotteries. This system is derived from our previous proposal [9]
for qualitative decision making tailored for Spohn’s theory of epistemic beliefs
[17]. The above example demonstrates the important role played by the lotteries
that realize either in the best prize x or the worst prize x. We will use the term
canonical for them. The set of all canonical lotteries is denoted by C
C def= {[λ/x, µ/x]|λ, µ ∈ V, max(λ, µ) = 1}. (7)
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We propose the following system of four axioms, denoted by S (without sub-
script), for preference relation on lotteries.
B1 (Total pre-order) 
 is reflexive, transitive and complete.
B2 (Qualitative monotonicity)
 restricted to C satisfies the following condition
[λ/x, µ/x] 
 [λ′/x, µ′/x] if


(1 ≥ λ ≥ λ′ & µ = µ′ = 1) ∨
(λ = 1 & λ′ < 1) ∨
(λ = λ′ = 1 & µ′ ≥ µ)
(8)
B3 (Substitutability) If π1 ∼ π2 then [λ/π1, µ/π] ∼ [λ/π2, µ/π].
B4 (Continuity) ∀x ∈ X, ∃σ ∈ C x ∼ σ.
We list the axioms of S in the same order as those of SP . Comparing S with
SP , we see immediately that axioms B1, B3 are the same as A1−, A3− and B4
is slightly more general than A4−. The crucial difference between two systems is
in the contrast between A2− (uncertainty aversion) vs B2 (monotonicity). This
similarity tells us that axioms B1, B3 and B4 could be justified in the same
manner as A1−, A3− and A4−. We will go in more details in section 4. Now
we investigate the properties of S. First, we state a lemma that describes the
structure of ΠX .
Lemma 3 Assume 
 satisfies S (axioms B1 through B4). For each π ∈ ΠX ,
there exists a σ ∈ C such that π ∼ σ.
Proof: By definition of possibilistic mixture (1), π can be rewritten in the
form of a mixture [π(x1)/x1, π(x2)/x2, . . . π(xn)/xn]. By B4, we have xi ∼ σi
for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . n} where σi is a canonical lottery σi = [λi/x, µi/x]. By B3,
we have π ∼ [π(x1)/σ1, π(x2)/σ2, . . . π(xn)/σn]. Again using the definition of







So π ∼ [λ/x, µ/x].
This lemma establishes a homomorphism between the set of lotteries and
one of its subset, C, with respect to 
. It allows us to focus on the set of
canonical lotteries, which have a simple structure. Before we can describe a
representation theorem for system S, we need an appropriate utility construct.
Any ordered set can serve that purpose. A real interval is often used as the
utility scale. However, it is well known that in certain situations, it is not
convenient to take an one-dimension set for the utility scale. Fishburn [8] shows
that if the Archimedian condition in von Neumann - Morgenstern theory is
relaxed, lotteries are represented in a lexicographic utility scale, which is a set
of tuples of reals equipped with a lexicographic order.
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In the probabilistic case, a canonical lottery can be represented by a single
number – the probability p of getting the best prize – because the probability
of getting the worst prize is 1 − p. The situation is different, however, in the
possibilistic case. The knowledge that the best prize is fully possible (λ = 1)
could imply nothing about the possibility of getting the worst prize (µ can take
any value in [0, 1]]). Therefore, to represent a possibilistic canonical lottery,
we need two parameters. We propose a concept of the binary utility scale
formed from a linearly ordered set. Suppose W is a linearly ordered scale, i.e.,
a set equipped with an order relation ≥. Also, we assume that supremum and
infimum of the elements of W exist and are denoted by 1 and 0, respectively.
We define a set UW of pairs as
UW
def= {〈a, b 〉|a, b ∈ W and max(a, b) = 1}. (11)
In other words, UW is the set of pairs of elements in W such that one of them
is 1. An complete order  on UW is defined as
〈a, b 〉 〈a′, b′ 〉 iff


(1 ≥ a ≥ a′ & b = b′ = 1) ∨
(a = 1 & a′ < 1) ∨
(a = a′ = 1 & b′ ≥ b)
(12)
Derivatives  (strict preference) and = (indifference) are also used. To
distinguish the order on pairs ( ) from the order on scalar (≥), we adopt
the following convention:  reads “higher”,  – “strictly higher” whereas
≥ reads “larger” and > – “strictly larger”. The special structure of UW i.e.,
〈a, b 〉 ∈ UW implies max(a, b) = 1, allows a simplification of eq.(12) to
〈a, b 〉  〈a′, b′ 〉 iff (a > a′) ∨ (b < b′) (13)
We call UW equipped with the order  as the binary utility scale based on
W . This is a special case of a lexicographic order in Fishburn’s sense. Although
one index is used to resolve a tie in the other index, no index has precedence over
the other. Intuitively, one can think of a binary utility level as a pair of indices
reflecting two aspects of a quantity where the first number is the “positive”
index and the second number is the “negative” index. Thus, eq. (13) says that
a utility level u is higher than utility level u′ if either the positive index of u is
larger than the corresponding index of u′ or the negative index of u is smaller
than that of u′. Let us describe operations on pairs that are useful later on.
Since the indices in UW are members of a linearly ordered scale W where min
and max are well defined, we can extend these operations for pairs. Suppose
α, β, γ, δ ∈W .
min(〈α, β 〉, 〈γ, δ 〉) def= 〈 min(α, γ),min(β, δ) 〉 (14)
max(〈α, β 〉, 〈γ, δ 〉) def= 〈 max(α, γ),max(β, δ) 〉 (15)
Before we describe some properties of extended min and max, it is important
to note that these operations are just shorthands for doing pairwise minimization
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❄
✲ 〈1, 1 〉
〈1, 0 〉
〈0, 1 〉
Figure 1: The binary utility scale UW .
and maximization on scalars. They are not intended for finding infimum and
supremum according to  . In other words, for u, v ∈ UW we can deduce
neither max(u, v) u nor max(u, v) v. To do so we use sup notation. For
Z ⊆ UW
sup(Z) ∈ Z and ∀z ∈ Z sup(Z) z (16)
We have sup(Z) ∈ Z because W and therefore UW is assumed to be finite.
Lemma 4
(i) UW is closed under max, i.e., if u, u′ ∈ UW then max(u, u′) ∈ UW .
(ii) min,max are monotone on each argument, e.g., for u, u′, v, v′ ∈ UW
max(u, v) max(u, v′) if v v′.
Proof: (i) Let u = 〈a, b 〉, u′ = 〈a′, b′ 〉. Since u, u′ ∈ UW implies max(a, b) =
max(a′, b′) = 1. max(u, u′) = 〈 max(a, a′),max(b, b′) 〉. We have
max{max(a, a′),max(b, b′)} = max{a, a′, b, b′} = 1. (17)
(ii) Let u = 〈a, b 〉, v = 〈c, d 〉, v′ = 〈c′, d′ 〉. We have from v v′ either v = v′
i.e., c = c′ and d = d′, or v  v′. In the first case, obviously max(u, v) =
max(u, v′). In the second case, by eq. (13), we have either c > c′ or d < d′.
Moreover, c > c′ implies d′ ≥ d, and d < d′ implies c ≥ c′ since max(c, d) =
max(c′, d′) = 1. By definition of extended max in eq. (15) we have max(u, v) =
〈 max(a, c),max(b, d)〉 and max(u, v′) = 〈 max(a, c′),max(b, d′)〉. In both cases
of v  v′, we have max(a, c) ≥ max(a, c′) and max(b, d′) ≥ max(b, d). Thus
the positive index of max(u, v) is larger than or equal to that of max(u, v′) while
the negative index of the former is smaller than or equal to one of the latter.
Let us call a function u : X → UW that assigns utility for each prize in X
a basic utility assessment. We say that a basic utility assessment is consistent
with 
 if for any pair x, y ∈ X x 
 y iff u(x) u(y). For a given basic utility




where k is a binary vector function k = 〈 k1, k2 〉 and each kr for r = 1, 2 is
an order preserving mapping V → W such that kr(1) = 1 and kr(0) = 0. In
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addition, function k is required to satisfy the following condition with respect
to utility assignment u.
k1(V ) ⊇ uL(X) and k2(V ) ⊇ uR(X) (19)
where uL(x) and uR(x) are the left and the right components of pair u(x) re-
spectively; uL(X) = {uL(x)|x ∈ X} is the set of left values and uR(X) is the
set of right values. This property is weaker than the requirement in the defini-
tions of QU− , QU+ that function h defined in eq.(4) is an onto mapping since
uL(X), uR(X) ⊆W . The fact that PU(π) ∈ UW is easy to verify. Because ∃xi ∈
X such that π(xi) = 1, k(π(xi)) = 〈 1, 1 〉. So, min(k(π(xi)), u(xi)) = u(xi) ∈
UW . And therefore, maxx∈X min(k(π(x)), u(x)) ∈ UW . Comparing PU with the
expected utility construct for probabilistic lottery p, EU(p) def=
∑
x∈X p(x)u(x),
we see that operations max and min are used instead of addition and multipli-
cation respectively. We call PU(π) the expected qualitative utility of lottery π.
In the next two lemmas, we describe some properties of PU.
Lemma 5 PU(x) = u(x).
Proof: Since we can write x in a form of lottery πx such that πx(x) = 1 and




= max{{min(〈0, 0 〉, u(y))|y 	= x},min(〈1, 1 〉, u(x))}
= u(x).
From eq.(18), it is obvious that given k, a utility function is uniquely defined
by a basic utility assessment. However, lemma 5 allows us to view eq. (18)
not only as a constructive definition of PU but also as property satisfied by a
utility function PU : ΠX → UW without referring to a basic utility assessment.
Constructively, the former view is easy to understand but conceptually, the
latter is more convenient. The two views will be used interchangeably.
Lemma 6 Assume PU is defined as in eq. (18). Suppose x is a prize such that
x  x  x. Then there exists a canonical lottery σ = [α/x, β/x] such that
PU(σ) = PU(x).
Proof: Suppose for the basic utility assessment u(x) = 〈λ1, µ1〉, u(x) = 〈λ2, µ2〉
and u(x) = 〈λ3, µ3 〉. Since u is assumed to be consistent and x  x  x, we
have λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ λ3 and µ3 ≥ µ2 ≥ µ1. By condition eq. (19), we can choose
α, β ∈ V such that k1(α) = λ2 and k2(β) = µ2. Since max(λ2, µ2) = 1, we can
choose α, β so that max(α, β) = 1. Let us calculate PU for [α/x, β/x]
PU([α/x, β/x]) = max
{
min(〈k1(α), k2(α) 〉, 〈λ1, µ1 〉),
min(〈k1(β), k2(β) 〉, 〈λ3, µ3 〉)
}
= max
{ 〈 min(k1(α), λ1),min(k2(α), µ1) 〉,
〈 min(k1(β), λ3),min(k2(β), µ3) 〉
}
= 〈k1(α), k2(β) 〉 = 〈λ2, µ2 〉
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The chain of transformation is made possible by application of extended max,
min and the facts that λ1 ≥ k1(α) = λ2 ≥ λ3 and µ3 ≥ k2(β) = µ2 ≥ µ1.
We now state and prove the main representation theorem.
Theorem 2 
 on ΠX satisfies axioms B1 through B4 if and only if there exists
a utility function PU : ΠX → UV satisfying eq. (18) such that π 
 π′ if and
only if PU(π) PU(π′) ∀π, π′ ∈ ΠX .
Proof: Notice that the uncertainty scale V is used for the linear order on which
the utility scale is based.
(⇒) Suppose 
 satisfies axioms B1 through B4. For π1, π2 ∈ ΠX , let us
assume π1(xi) = π1i and π2(xi) = π2i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . n}. We will construct
function k and PU such that PU(π1) PU(π2) if π1 
 π2. Since the relation 

on C is a pre-order, let us consider C/∼ — the set of equivalence classes. The
equivalence class containing σ is denoted by [[σ]]. Without loss of generality,
we assume a strict order x = x1 > x2 > . . . > xn = x. By B4, [[xi]] 	= ∅
for all i. Let us choose an element from each equivalence class and call it the
representative. For [[x1]], [1/x, 0/x] is selected, for [[xn]] it is [0/x, 1/x]. For
any other equivalence class, an element is selected arbitrarily. If [λi/x, µi/x]
and [λj/x, µj/x] are not in one class, then either [λi/x, µi/x]  [λj/x, µj/x] or
[λj/x, µj/x]  [λi/x, µi/x]. If [λi/x, µi/x]  [λj/x, µj/x], because of B2, then
either λi > λj or µi < µj . We will proceed to define functions k1, k2 : V → V.




λi if [λi/x, 1/x] is the representative of [[λ/x, 1/x]]




µi if [1/x, µi/x] is the representative of [[1/x, µ/x]]
1 if [λ/x, 1/x] is the representative of [[1/x, µ/x]] (21)
kr(0)
def= 0 for r = 1, 2 (22)
kr(1)
def= 1 for r = 1, 2 (23)
We will show k1(α) ≥ k1(β) if α ≥ β. For k2, the proof is similar. If β = 0,
by equation (22), k1(β) = 0. So, k1(α) ≥ k1(β). If α = 1, by equation (23),
k1(α) = 1. Again, k1(α) ≥ k1(β). Otherwise if 1 > α ≥ β > 0, k1(α), k1(β)
are determined by equation (20). By B2, we have [α/x, 1/x] 
 [β/x, 1/x]. If
those two canonical lotteries are in the same class [[λi/x, µi/x]] then k1(α) =
k1(β) = λi. If they are in different classes say [[λi/x, µi/x]] and [[λj/x, µj/x]],
then [λi/x, µi/x]  [λj/x, µj/x]. By B2 we have λi ≥ λj . Thus k1(α) = λi ≥
λj = k1(β). Let us construct a basic utility assessment u as follows u(x) = 〈1, 0〉,
u(x) = 〈0, 1 〉 and
u(xi) = 〈k1(λi), k2(µi) 〉 if xi ∈ [[λi/x, µi/x]] (24)
Thus, u and k satisfy condition listed in eq. (19). Assume xi ∼ [λi/x, µi/x] = σi
for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . n}. By B3, we have
πr = [πr1/x1, πr2/x2, . . . πrn/xn] ∼ [πr1/σ1, πr2/σ2, . . . πrn/σn] for r = 1, 2.
(25)
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Let us give a name ρr for [πr1/σ1, πr2/σ2, . . . πrn/σn] (r = 1, 2). We will show




min(πri, λi) and ρr(x) = max
i∈{1,2,...n}
min(πri, µi) (26)
and for all other x ∈ X
ρr(x) = max
i∈{1,2,...n}
min(πri, 0) = 0 (27)
By B1, from π1 
 π2 we have ρ1 
 ρ2, which means either ρ1 ∼ ρ2 or ρ1  ρ2.
In case ρ1 ∼ ρ2, by definition of functions k1, k2 we have
k1(ρ1(x)) = k1(ρ2(x)) and k2(ρ1(x)) = k2(ρ2(x)) (28)
In case ρ1  ρ2 by B2 we have
k1(ρ1(x)) > k1(ρ2(x)) or k2(ρ1(x)) < k2(ρ2(x)) (29)
Now let us calculate utilities of π1, π2
PU(π1) = max
i∈{1,2,...n}
{min(〈k1(π1i), k2(π1i) 〉, u(xi))}
= max
i∈{1,2,...n}
{min(〈k1(π1i), k2(π1i) 〉, 〈k1(λi), k2(µi) 〉)}
= max
i∈{1,2,...n}
{〈 min(k1(π1i), k1(λi),min(k2(π1i), k2(µi))〉}
= max
i∈{1,2,...n}
{〈 (k1(min(π1i, λi)), k2(min(π1i, µi))〉}
= 〈k1( max
i∈{1,2,...n}




The transformation chain is made possible by the assumption about u(xi), the
properties of min,max, the monotonicity of k1, k2 and equation (26). Recall that
if π1 
 π2 then either condition (28) or (29) must hold. In either case, that im-
plies 〈k1(ρ1(x)), k2(ρ1(x))〉  〈k1(ρ2(x)), k2(ρ2(x))〉. Thus, PU(π1) PU(π2).
(⇐) For a given consistent basic utility assessment u : X → UV , order
preserving functions k1, k2 such that kr(0) = 0, kr(1) = 1, a function PU :
ΠX → UV is defined as in (18). We will show that order 
PU on ΠX induced
by PU i.e., π 
PU π′ iff PU(π) PU(π′) satisfies axioms B1 through B4.
B1 is satisfied because the order on UV is reflexive, transitive and complete.
We turn to B2. Suppose σ = [λ/x, µ/x], σ′ = [λ′/x, µ′/x] are two canonical
lotteries that satisfy one of three conditions (1) (λ ≥ λ′ & µ = µ′ = 1), (2)
(λ = λ′ = 1 & µ′ ≥ µ) or (3) (λ = 1 > λ′). We have to show PU(σ) PU(σ′).
Let us assume u(x) = 〈λ, µ〉 and u(x) = 〈λ, µ〉. Since u is consistent and x  x
we have either (λ > λ & µ = µ) or (λ = λ & µ < µ) or (1 = λ > λ & µ < µ = 1).
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Applying definition (18), we have
PU(σ)
= max{min(〈k1(λ), k2(λ) 〉, 〈λ, µ〉),min(〈k1(µ), k2(µ) 〉, 〈λ, µ 〉)}
= max{〈 min(k1(λ), λ),min(k2(λ), µ) 〉, 〈 min(k1(µ), λ),min(k2(µ), µ) 〉}
= 〈 max{min(k1(λ), λ),min(k1(µ), λ)},max{min(k2(λ), µ),min(k2(µ), µ)}〉
Thus, the positive (left) ρl and the negative indices (right) ρr of PU(σ) and
PU(σ′) are
ρl(σ) = max{min(k1(λ), λ),min(k1(µ), λ)}
ρl(σ′) = max{min(k1(λ′), λ),min(k1(µ′), λ)}
ρr(σ) = max{min(k2(λ), µ),min(k2(µ), µ)}
ρr(σ′) = max{min(k2(λ′), µ),min(k2(µ′), µ)}
In case (1) when λ ≥ λ′ and µ = µ′ = 1, since operations used are all order
preserving, we conclude ρl(σ) ≥ ρl(σ′). In case (2) when λ = λ′ = 1 and µ′ ≥ µ,
we have ρr(σ′) ≤ ρr(σ). In the last case, from 1 = λ > λ′ we also have µ′ ≤ µ.
By the same argument we will have both ρl(σ) ≥ ρl(σ′) and ρr(σ′) ≥ ρr(σ). By
definition given in eq. (12) we have PU(σ) PU(σ′) and that means σ 
PU σ′.
Thus B2 is satisfied. Suppose π1 ∼PU π2. We have PU(π1) = PU(π2). By
definition (18), we will have PU([λ/π1, µ/π]) = PU([λ/π2, µ/π]). This means
[λ/π1, µ/π] ∼PU [λ/π2, µ/π]. Thus, 
PU satisfies B3. Finally, the existence of
basic utility assessment u and lemma 6 guarantee satisfaction of B4.
This representation theorem summarizes the utility theory for possibility
theory. Among other things this theorem shows that axiom system S is free
from inconsistency. The main corollary is the decision rule, which we call maxi-
mization of expected qualitative utility (MEQU): facing a choice among lotteries
in the set {L1, L2, . . . Ln}, a rational decision maker should choose
L∗ = arg sup
i∈{1,2,...n}
PU(Li) (30)
We illustrate MEQU with a numerical example.
Example 2. In this example, sets X , V and π1, π2, π3 are the same as used
in example 1. UV = {〈 0, 1 〉, 〈 .5, 1 〉, 〈 .7, 1 〉, 〈 1, 1 〉, 〈 1, .7 〉, 〈 1, .5 〉, 〈 1, 0 〉}. We
will consider three cases of revealed indifference relation between the prizes and
canonical lotteries.
Case 1. In this case, x ∼ [1/x, 0/x], x2 ∼ [1/x, .5/x], x3 ∼ [1/x, .7/x]
and x ∼ [1/x, 1/x]. This corresponds to a pessimistic decision maker. Utility
assignment for prizes is as follows u(x) = 〈1, 0〉, u(x2) = 〈1, .5〉, u(x3) = 〈1, .7〉
and u(x) = 〈1, 1 〉. We choose functions k1(0) = 0 and k1(v) = 1 for v ∈ V − 0;













min(〈1, .7 〉, 〈1, 0 〉)
min(〈1, 1 〉, 〈1, .5 〉)
min(〈1, .5 〉, 〈1, .7 〉)













= 〈1, .5 〉
Similarly we calculate PU(π2) = 〈1, 1〉 and PU(π3) = 〈1, 1〉. Thus π1  π2 ∼ π3.
This is the same preference order as in case 1 of example 1.
Case 2. In this case revealed indifference is x ∼ [1/x, 1/x], x2 ∼ [.7/x, 1/x],
x3 ∼ [.5/x, 1/x] and x ∼ [0/x, 1/x]. Utility assignment for prizes is as follows
u(x) = 〈 1, 1 〉, u(x2) = 〈 .7, 1 〉, u(x3) = 〈 .5, 1 〉 and u(x) = 〈 0, 1 〉. We choose
functions k1(v) = v for v ∈ V and k2(0) = 0 and k2(v) = 1 for v ∈ V − 0. We













min(〈 .7, 1 〉, 〈1, 1 〉)
min(〈1, 1 〉, 〈 .7, 1 〉)
min(〈 .5, 1 〉, 〈 .5, 1 〉)






〈 .7, 1 〉
〈 .7, 1 〉




= 〈 .7, 1 〉
We also calculate PU(π2) = 〈 .7, 1 〉 and PU(π3) = 〈1, 1 〉. Thus π3  π1 ∼ π2.
This is the same preference order as in case 2 of example 1.
Case 3. In this case revealed indifference is x ∼ [1/x, 0/x], x2 ∼ [1/x, .5/x],
x3 ∼ [.7/x, 1/x] and x ∼ [0/x, 1/x]. Utility assignment for prizes is as follows
u(x) = 〈 1, 0 〉, u(x2) = 〈 1, .5 〉, u(x3) = 〈 .7, 1 〉 and u(x) = 〈 0, 1 〉. Functions
k1, k2 are identity i.e., k(v) = 〈 v, v 〉 for v ∈ V . We calculate expected utility













min(〈 .7, .7 〉, 〈1, 0 〉)
min(〈1, 1 〉, 〈1, .5 〉)
min(〈 .5, .5 〉, 〈 .7, 1 〉)






〈 .7, 0 〉
〈1, .5 〉




= 〈1, .5 〉
Similarly we have PU(π2) = 〈 .7, 1 〉 and PU(π3) = 〈 1, 1 〉. So, PU ranks π1 
π3  π2.
4 A Comparison of Pessimistic, Optimistic and
Expected Utilities
In this section, we will compare the 3 axiomatic systems described in previous
sections. As already noted, the main difference is in the second axioms, so the
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discussion is focused on them.
First, we have some comments on uncertainty aversion (pessimism) and un-
certainty attraction (optimism) axioms. Since we have representation theorems
for each system, discussion can be carried out either in terms of axioms or in
terms of utility functions. We argue that those axioms should be removed in
favor of a more intuitive axiom B2 that imposes an order on set of canonical
lotteries. Finally, we prove a theorem showing that the pessimistic and opti-
mistic systems of axioms are special cases of the generalized system proposed
in section 3.
The adjectives “pessimistic” and “optimistic”, used for SP ,SO, apparently
refer to the opposite requirement of axioms A2− and A2+. If π1 ≥ π2 in nu-
merical sense, i.e., π1(xi) ≥ π2(xi) ∀i, then A2− requires π2 
 π1 while A2+
requires π1 
 π2. A2− and A2+ are uncertainty attitude axioms. The former is
“uncertainty aversion” and the latter is “uncertainty attraction”.
First, we comment about the terminology. Since SP ,SO are presented in the
style of von Neumann and Morgenstern [18], it is appropriate to recall similar
terms “risk aversion” and “risk attraction”. In the classical linear utility the-
ory, risk aversion (attraction) refers to the concavity (convexity) of the basic
utility assessment. In other words, risk aversion (risk attraction) is a property
ascribed to individual utility functions. They are not a property of the utility
theory. Although possibility theory deals with uncertainty, not risk, we feel that
this difference does not warrant the use of different decision theories in different
psychological states as implied by SP and SO. The term risk is used, according
to well accepted dichotomy, as uncertainty representable by a probability dis-
tribution. For example, it raises the obvious questions of how a decision maker
would classify herself as either “optimistic” or “pessimistic” and what would
happen if she could not be classified categorically as neither. The indifference
relation revealed in case 3 of example 2 illustrates the latter situation.
In possibilistic literature ([6]), it is established that inequality of the form
π1 ≥ π2 is an informational relationship. It says that π2 is more specific than
π1. In other words, it says that π2 contains more information than π1 does.
From that perspective, we fail to see the rationale for equating informational
relationship with preferential relationship 
. Although information has its own
value, informational value per se rarely serves as a decision criterion. For ex-
ample, decision making under uncertainty is mostly guided by von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s linear utility theory rather than by Shannon’s information
theory.
Let us analyze the pessimistic system in greater details with a understanding
that a similar analysis can be done for the optimistic system. Let us consider
the following example. A decision maker faces a choice between two lotteries
π1 = [1/x, 1/x] and π2 = x. In other words, π1 is a possibilistic distribution on X
such that π1(x) = π1(x) = 1, π1(x) = 0 for all other x and π2(x) = 1, π2(x) = 0
for all other x. According to possibility theory [6], π1 describes a situation
where we have knowledge to exclude all prizes except x and x. Moreover, the
occurrence of either of the two prizes is equally possible. π2 describes a situation
of complete knowledge where all but x are excluded. Because something is going
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to happen, π2 is equivalent to saying that x obtains for sure. Axiom A2− will
force the decision maker to consider π2 is at least as good as π1. To be exact,
a complete calculation would show that π1 ∼ π2. In other words, if we were to
adopt SP , we would have to be indifferent between a worst prize for sure and a
uncertain outcome in which we have reason to believe that the best prize is as
likely as the worst one. We consider such a preference intuitively unreasonable.
Next we will show that the pessimism axiom forces the continuity axiom
A4− to have an unnecessarily restricted form. To simplify the discussion, we
need some notations. The set of canonical lotteries C = {[λ/x, µ/x]| λ, µ ∈
V, max(λ, µ) = 1} can be divided into two segments
C− def= {[1/x, µ/x]| µ ∈ V } and C+ def= {[λ/x, 1/x]| λ ∈ V }. (31)
We will call C− the gain half of the set of canonical lotteries for the possibility
of getting the best prize is higher than or equal to the possibility of getting
the worst prize and C+ – the loss half. These terms are used relatively to the
fair lottery [1/x, 1/x]. “Gain” does not mean a positive monetary value nor
“loss” means a negative monetary value. We have C = C− ∪ C+ and C− ∩ C+ =
[1/x, 1/x]. Using this notation, axioms A4− and A4+ can be restated as follows
∀π ∈ ΠX , ∃σ ∈ C− such that π ∼ σ, and ∀π ∈ ΠX , ∃σ ∈ C+ such that π ∼ σ,
respectively. We will show that these axioms can be weakened, without any
effect on the results, by requiring ∀x ∈ X in place of ∀π ∈ ΠX i.e.,
(B4−) ∀x ∈ X, ∃σ ∈ C− x ∼ σ.
(B4+) ∀x ∈ X, ∃σ ∈ C+ x ∼ σ.
Lemma 7
(i) A relation 
− satisfies A1−, A2−, A3− and A4− iff it satisfies A1−, A2−,
A3− and B4−.
(ii) A relation 
+ satisfies A1+, A2+, A3+ and A4+ iff it satisfies A1+, A2+,
A3+ and B4+.
Proof: We will prove (i). The proof of (ii) is similar.
(⇒) is obvious because X ⊂ ΠX .
(⇐) By B4−, each xi ∈ X is indifferent to some canonical lottery σi = [1/x, µi/x]
For any π ∈ ΠX , we can write π = [π1/x1, . . . πn/xn]. By A3−, we have π ∼
[π1/σ1, . . . πn/σn]. By definition of possibilistic mixture we have [π1/σ1, π2/σ2, . . .
πn/σn] ∼ [ρ1/x, ρ2/x] where
ρ1 = max
i∈{1,2,...n}
{min(πi, 1)} ρ2 = max
i∈{1,2,...n}
{min(πi, µi)} (32)
Since maxi∈{1,2,...n} πi = 1, we have ρ1 = 1 Thus, A4− is satisfied.
A natural question arises: would a simple replacement of A4− by B4 solve
the problem? The answer is no, if one insists on keeping A2−. Had A4− been
substituted by B4 ∀x ∈ X, ∃σ ∈ C x ∼ σ, we would still have x ∼ [1/x, 1/x],
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because [1/x, 1/x] was the minimal element in C according to A2−. Moreover,
the substitution would ruin the representation theorem 1. To show this problem,
we need the following lemma
Lemma 8 Suppose π1 
 π2 then
QU− ([λ/π1, 1/π2]) = QU− (π2) (33)
QU+ ([1/π1, µ/π2]) = QU+ (π1). (34)
Proof: We will prove (33). The proof of (34) is similar. We have by eq. (5)
QU− ([λ/π1, 1/π2]) = min{max(nh(λ), QU− (π1)), max(nh(1), QU− (π2))} (35)
By definition of function nh eqs. (3,4), nh(1) = 0. So, max(nh(1), QU− (π2)) =
QU− (π2). Since π1 
 π2, QU− (π1) ≥ QU− (π2). So, we have max(nh(λ), QU− (π1))
≥ QU− (π2). By equation (35), we have QU− ([λ/π1, 1/π2]) = QU− (π2).
Now, let us assume for a moment A4− is replaced by B4 in SP . So, for
some x′  x we have x′ ∼ [λ/x, 1/x]. By lemma 8, QU− ([λ/x, 1/x]) = QU− (x).
Since x′  x, we conclude that QU− does not represent 
.
Furthermore, we argue that A4− contradicts intuitively the pessimistic spirit
of A2−. A4− requires that any lottery is equivalent to some canonical lottery
where the best prize (x) is more possible or as possible as the least desirable
prize (x). This fact is also implied from the weakened version B4−. In that
sense, if a decision maker holds a preference satisfying the pessimistic system,
she must be, in fact, too optimistic because in her uncertain universe the best
prize always has higher possibility of realization than the worst prize.
We have just analyzed the problems with the pessimistic SP . A similar
critique can be made against the optimistic SO. This analysis leads to the
conclusion that uncertainty attitude axioms A2−, A2+ are the reasons behind
the problems of systems SP and SO. We propose a remedy in axiom system S.
Instead of A2−, A2+ we have B2 that imposes an order on canonical lotteries.
It is important to note that B2 can be justified without invoking information
consideration. Since canonical lottery σ ∈ C is a possibility distribution on X
such that σ(x) = λ, σ(x) = µ and σ(x) = 0 for all other x ∈ X, the possibility
degree and the necessity degree assigned by σ to x are λ and 1 − µ. Because
different canonical lotteries have exactly the same prizes, the intuitive preference
boils down to comparing how sure the prizes will be realized. Obviously, the
higher the confidence of getting the most desirable prize the better, provided
that the confidence of getting the worst prize is the same or weaker. In possibility
theory, the highest confidence – completely sure – is expressed by necessity
degree equal to 1. N(x) = 1 means λ = 1 and µ = 0. The confidence level
is decreasing when necessity falling to 0. This movement corresponds to µ
increasing to 1. Before necessity degree becomes 0, the possibility is always 1.
Once necessity equals 0, the confidence level can drop further with the falling of
possibility degree from 1 to 0. The least confidence level is when the possibility
degree is 0 i.e. λ = 0 and µ = 1.
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In [11] we propose a theoretically more interesting justification for B2 based
on the concept of first degree stochastic dominance.
Axiom B2 (order between canonical lotteries) is able to unify and extend the
effects achieved by two contradictory premises namely pessimism and optimism.
It is straightforward to verify the following lemma
Lemma 9 Let 
−,
+ and 
 denote, respectively, the order relations on C−,
C+ and C imposed by A2−, A2+ and B2. We have 
 = 
− ∪ 
+ ∪ (C−× C+)
The lemma shows that 
− (
+) is 
 restricted to C− (C+). This relationship
has a direct consequence to the discrimination power of axiom systems (utility
functions) because, as noted, each lottery is equivalent to some canonical lottery.
Roughly, if the uncertainty scale V has cardinality n, SP (SO) divides ΠX into
n equivalence classes while S makes 2n− 1 classes.
We have the following theorem that states precisely the relationship between
systems SP , SO and S.
Theorem 3
(i) SP |= S
(ii) SO |= S
(iii) S, B4− |= SP
(iv) S, B4+ |= SO
Proof: We will prove (i) and (iii). The proofs of (ii) and (iv) are similar.
(i) Assume A1− through A4− are satisfied, since B1 is the same as A1− and
B3 is the same as A3−, we are left to prove that B2 and B4 are also satisfied.
From A4− for each π ∈ ΠX , ∃σ ∈ C− π ∼ σ. Obviously, X ⊆ ΠX and C− ⊆ C,
so B4 is also satisfied. And finally, we will show that SP |= B2. Assume that

 satisfies SP . For two canonical lotteries σ = [λ/x, µ/x] and σ′ = [λ′/x, µ′/x].





1 ≥ λ ≥ λ′ & µ = µ′ = 1 (a)
λ = 1 & λ′ < 1 (b)
λ = λ′ = 1 & µ′ ≥ µ (c)
(36)
Observe that by theorem 1 and lemma 8, to a pessimistic decision maker,
when the possibility associated with a less desirable prize is 1 then the lottery
is indifferent to that prize. If µ = 1 then σ ∼ x ∼ [1/x, 1/x]. If µ′ = 1 then
σ′ ∼ x ∼ [1/x, 1/x]. In case (a) when µ = µ′ = 1, we have σ ∼ x ∼ σ′. Thus,
σ 
 σ′. In case (b), since max(λ′, µ′) = 1 from λ′ < 1 we have µ′ = 1. Therefore,
σ′ ∼ [1/x, 1/x]. By axiom A2− we have σ 
 [1/x, 1/x]. From transitivity, σ 
 σ′.
In case (c), since λ = λ′ = 1 and µ′ ≥ µ, by A2− we have σ 
 σ′.
(iii) Note that since B4− |= B4, the set of axioms S ∪ B4− is effectively
one that is obtained by substituting B4 by B4−. We have to show that if
B1, B2, B3 and B4− are satisfied so are A1−, A2−, A3− and A4−. Again, we
do not have to worry about A1− and A3− since they are identical to B1 and B3.
We will show that A4− is satisfied. By B4− we assume xi ∼ σi = [1/x, µi/x]
for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . n}. We will show that ∀π ∈ ΠX , ∃σ ∈ C− π ∼ σ. By B3,
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π ∼ [π(x1)/σ1, π(x2)/σ2 . . . π(xn)/σn]. Applying the definition of mixture (1)
for the right hand side, say ρ, of the indifference
ρ(x) = max
i∈{1,2,...n}
min(π(xi), 1) ρ(x) = max
i∈{1,2,...n}
min(π(xi), µi) (37)
and for all other x ∈ X
ρ(x) = max
i∈{1,2,...n}
min(π(xi), 0) = 0 (38)
We have ρ(x) = 1 because maxi(π(xi)) = 1. Thus π ∼ [1/x, ρ(x)/x].
Now we turn to A2−. Suppose π1 ≥ π2. We show that π1 ∼ [1/x, ρ1(x)/x)
and π2 ∼ [1/x, ρ2(x)/x] where ρr(x) r = 1, 2 is calculated by equation (37).
Since π1 ≥ π2, and functions min,max are increasing on each argument, we
have ρ1(x) ≥ ρ2(x). By B2, we have [1/x, ρ2(x)/x] 
 [1/x, ρ1(x)/x]. From this,
by transitivity we have π2 
 π1.
Corollary 1 System SP (SO) is a special case of S when each prize in X has
an equivalent canonical lottery in C− (C+).
It is clear that S is more general than either SP or SO because C− and C+ are
just two proper subsets of C.
This corollary also demonstrates the point made earlier that, in our view,
there is no real need for separating decision making with possibility theory into
the pessimistic or the optimistic modes. In our possibilistic decision theory, the
“pessimistic behavior” is the result of assigning gain utilities to prizes whereas
the “optimistic behavior” is the result of assigning loss utilities to prizes. In
other words, there is one utility theory that works for all possibilistic decision
makers. And the difference in observed behaviors can be explained by different
utility assignments. Example 2 illustrates this fact. Case 1, involving gains only,
corresponds to a pessimistic mode; case 2, with loss prizes, to an optimistic
mode. However, case 3 involving both gains and losses could be handled in
neither pessimistic nor optimistic framework.
Since binary utility is represented by two numbers whereas pessimistic and
optimistic utility by one number each, a question that could be raised is whether
coupling QU− , QU+ into a lexicographic order would yield PU.
In [5], Dubois et al. consider a lexicographic aggregation of pessimistic and
optimistic rankings in order to increase the discrimination power. Let us summa-
rize their result by skipping nonessential technical details. The authors consider
(MA0g – page 435, [5]) two preference relations 
− and 
+ that satisfy SP and
SO respectively. In addition, these preference relations are assumed to satisfy 3
conditions as follows.
(1) ∀x, y ∈ X, x 
− y iff x 
+ y
(2) ∀λ, µ ∈ V, [1/x, λ/x] − [1/x, µ/x] iff [µ/x, 1/x] + [λ/x, 1/x]
(3) The number of equivalence classes by indifference relations is the same as




+, a new preference relation 
−+ can be defined by lexico-
graphic aggregation as
π1 −+ π2 iff (π1 − π2) ∨ (π1 ∼− π2 & π1 + π2) (39)
Because of representation theorems for SP and SO, one would expect that this

−+ could be represented by a lexicographic aggregation of pessimistic and
optimistic utilities (QU− , QU+ ). Indeed, it is the case (theorem 3, page 435).
With the purpose of forming a more discriminant order, one can, in prin-
ciple, aggregate any number of preference orders (not necessary a combination
of a pessimistic and a optimistic) without regards to the existence of a consis-
tent axiom system underlying the aggregated preference. The only condition
necessary for this type of aggregation to make sense is the establishment of a
priority order over the agents or the criteria. For the lexicographic aggregation
of 
− and 
+, the inconsistency of underlying axiom systems SP and SO is a
non-issue.
A lexicographic utility can be used, as Fishburn [8] has shown, to represent
certain axiom systems, which do not have a convenient representation by a
real value utility function. The study of binary utility in this paper falls in this
category. Given that consideration, the syntactical similarity between the binary
utility (PU) and the aggregation of pessimistic and optimistic utilities should
not blur the fact that they are designed for different situations. The former
is to represent the preference, based on a single decision criterion (implicit in
the total pre-order axiom), of a single (rational) decision maker. The latter
is supposed to reflect a situation involving more than one agents (sources or
decision criteria). Therefore, there is hardly a common ground to compare 
PU
and 
−+ except on the discrimination power dimension.
In the formulation of MA0g, which enables a representation theorem, there
is one condition that seriously impairs the purpose of increasing discrimination
power. Condition (3) requires that the number of equivalence classes formed
by each relation 
−,
+ is the same as the number of prizes (|X |). So in
combination, 
−+ can deliver |X |2 equivalence classes at most. This upper
bound is independent of the refinement degree (cardinality) of uncertainty scale.
A preference induced by Wald’s minimax rule has a similar property. In an
extreme example, if X = {x, x}, 
−+ can separate ΠX into four levels at most.
In contrast, discrimination power of S correlates with the refinement degree of
the uncertainty scale because the set of prototypes on which all lotteries are
compared with is taken to be the set of canonical lotteries (|C| = 2|V | − 1)
assuming only |C| ≥ |X | (axiom B4). This property is shared by a preference
relation represented by vNM linear utility. For example with X = {x, x} and
10-level uncertainty scale (|V | = 10), a preference relation 
 satisfying S divides
ΠX into 19 equivalence classes.
The above arguments make clear that the reasoning based on binary utility
should not be viewed as a combination of pessimistic and optimistic reasonings.
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5 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a new system of axioms for decision making
with possibility theory. Our axiomatic system (S) unifies and generalizes the
pessimistic and optimistic systems of axioms (SP ,SO) previously proposed by
Dubois et al. The unification is made by (i) substituting two informational at-
titude axioms expressing pessimism and optimism (uncertainty aversion and
uncertainty attraction) by the monotonicity axiom B2 that could be intuitively
justified in the spirit of “sure-thing” principle; (ii) generalization of continuity
axioms. Pessimistic and optimistic systems are proper special cases of the new
system. Our system handles lotteries involving both gains and losses whereas
the pessimistic system works for lotteries involving gains only and the optimistic
system—those with losses only. Conceptually, in our proposal, uncertainty at-
titude is implicit in the individual utility functions rather than explicit as an
axiom.
We also prove a representation theorem for the unified axiom system. Any
preference relation satisfying the axiom system can be represented by a utility
function that maps lotteries into an linearly ordered binary utility scale where
each utility level is a pair of numbers. The utility function is a composition of
max, min operations that have been generalized in a natural way to work with
pairs. Structurally, it is similar to the composition of the classic expected utility
expression where in place of addition and multiplication, max and min are used
respectively.
It is well known that probability theory interprets negation operation in a
strictly complementary sense i.e., p(¬A) = 1−p(A). This fact makes it sufficient
to represent the chance (or belief in Savage’s personalistic view) of an event by
one number—its probability. Unlike probability theory, possibility theory as
well as other non-probabilistic uncertainty calculi e.g., Dempster-Shafer belief
function theory [15, 16] or interval-valued probability [12, 19] describe uncer-
tainty of an event by two numbers. They are possibility and necessity degrees in
possibility theory; plausibility and belief in DS theory; upper and lower proba-
bilities in interval-valued probability theory. It is also well known that the heart
of decision making under uncertainty is the trade-offs between uncertainty and
consequences. In order to enable the trade-offs, utility and uncertainty must
be “comparable.” For these reasons, we speculate that a binary utility scale is,
perhaps, the “correct” answer to a binary representation of uncertainty.
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